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Purpose:  Our objective is to analyze the influence that the type of  CEO has on the management of
listed family businesses in Spain, distinguishing between whether the CEO is a family member or not.
The study mainly focuses on his/her influence on levels of  profitability.
Design/methodology: During de period from, 2012 to 2016, with data coming from Iberian Balance
Sheet Analysis System (SABI) database. To analyze the effects of  the CEOs on family businesses, we
carried out two kinds of  analyses.  First,  a univariate analysis  that  allowed us to identify differences
regarding profitability, financial structure, growth, and dividend payout policies, and secondly, a linear
regression model to see the influence—as well as the effect and significance—that variables, including
the type CEO, had on profitability. 
Findings: Our results show the existence of  a double effect on the profitability of  family businesses of
having an outside CEO. First, there is a statistically significant negative effect that is derived from the
non-family CEOs’ increased propensity to take on debt, and secondly, there is a positive causal effect on
businesses’ profitability that has to do with the different management styles that outside CEOs bring to
the table, as they are more focused on profits. The results support the importance of  having non-family
CEOs in listed family businesses in Spain.
Research limitations/implications:  Our study focused on family businesses listed on the Spanish
stock market,  which means that the number of  companies that were analyzed was reduced and the
results cannot be extended to other kinds of  businesses. However, this fact did enable us to get more
high-quality data and focus on a specific field that was appropriate for considering the problem we
proposed.
Originality/value: While many studies have compared the performance of  family businesses with that
of  non-family businesses, few have considered that family businesses are not homogeneous and that
they have different management styles. And, These styles are determined by the type of  CEO that is
leading the company; this fact is analyzed empirically in this article.
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1. Introduction
When considering the characteristics of  family businesses or the manner in which they act in comparison to
non-family  businesses,  there  is  one  particular  factor  concerning  governance  that  often  goes  unconsidered:
whether the CEO is a family member or not. These cases could have differing effects on the performance of  the
business.
From a theoretical  point of  view, the impact that  these different types of  CEOs can have on the level  of
achievement of  the business is unclear. On the one hand, as some have suggested, family CEOs could achieve
more than other executives as they receive non-monetary compensation, in addition to the normal benefits that
any CEO would receive (Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). It has also been argued
that they have specific knowledge about the business that would be tough for an outsider to get and that they
generate higher levels of  confidence among stakeholders (Donnelley, 1964). Family executives could also benefit
from having a long-term focus that non-family CEOs lack (Cadbury, 2000). On the other hand, some authors
have suggested that family CEOs could actually perform worse due to the tension that arises from balancing
family- and business-related objectives (Levinson, 1971; Barnes & Hershon, 1976; Lansberg, 1983).
Thus, the CEO’s relation to the family represents a factor that  could lead to differences when it  comes to
managing a family business. So, when the CEO is a family member, it is expected that he/she will make decisions
focused on ensuring the future  survival  of  the  business  and ensuring that  the family maintains  control  of
ownership. It is expected that an outside CEO will be more worried about producing positive results that attest
to his/her abilities and will be less concerned with family interests. A non-family CEO will put profitability first,
instead of  maintaining so-called socioemotional wealth (SEW; Gallizo, Moreno & Sánchez, 2017a). The behavior
of  the outside CEO, however, could be subject to the control that owners exert over his/her managing of  the
company (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997).
Our first hypothesis is that various priorities that drive the decision making of  family CEOs and non-family
CEOs lead to differences in management indicators in family businesses. Some of  these differences should be
able to be seen in policies related to financing, investment, and distributing profits. Furthermore, the managerial
decisions made in one case or the other should have a direct effect on the performance of  the business.
From  our  point  of  view,  the  greater  profit  orientation  of  an  outside  CEO,  as  well  as  his/her  different
management style in comparison to some family CEOs, lead to a situation in which an outside CEO running a
family business will generate a greater return on assets (ROA). This is the second hypothesis that we test in the
present article.
Considering our objectives, we used listed family businesses (on the Spanish stock market) from 2012 to 2016 as
the  sample  for  our  study.  We decided  to  focus  on listed  companies  as  they  are  required  to  provide  more
information and thus the classification between family and non-family businesses and CEOs was more reliable.
To test our hypotheses, we carried out two different analyses: first, a univariate analysis in which variables related
to the businesses’ financial structures, growth policies,  and dividend policies were analyzed; and secondly, in
order to determine whether the type of  CEO had a significant influence on ROA, a linear regression model in
which the type of  CEO was included along with other control variables. 
The results we obtained show the existence of  differences in business management depending on whether the
CEO is a family member or not. Regarding the influence of  outside CEOs on ROA, we observed a two-sided
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effect: one negative due to their increased propensity to take on debt, and one positive due to their different
management style and their focus on profits.
The rest of  the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the differences that may exist
between family CEOs and non-family CEOs as well as the motives behind their presence at the company. In the
third section, we describe the sample and the models used in this study. In the fourth section, we present the
results that we obtained, and in the last section we make some comments to summarize the main conclusions
that can be drawn. 
2. Family CEOs and non-family CEOs in family businesses 
Although many studies have considered the differences that exist between how family and non-family businesses
are run, not many have considered that family businesses do not represent a homogeneous business category. As
suggested  by  Lin  and  Hu  (2007),  classifying  all  family  businesses  into  one  category  could  lead  to  biased
conclusions, and thus other, operations-level characteristics (e.g., the type of  CEO managing the company) must
be taken into account.
In this way, and in the framework of  agency theory (Jensen & Meckling; 1976), the presence of  an outside CEO
could lead to  agency problems and their  corresponding costs.  The principal-agent  relationship  involves  the
delegation of  decision-making powers by the owners (principal) to the CEO (agent). If  both parties are looking
to maximize their own benefit, we can see that this situation would marginalize the CEO when it comes to
making certain discretionary decisions that are not actually in line with the objectives of  the owners. This could
lead to the appearance of  known agency costs between the agent and the principal: different motivation between
them;  asymmetric  information,  as  the  agent  has  specific,  defined  information  about  his/her  work  that  the
principal does not know; and predisposition to taking different levels of  risk. And these costs are even greater in
companies  with  dispersed  ownership  structures  (Jensen  &  Meckling,  1976)  than  in  companies  with  more
concentrated ownership structures, as the principal can exert a greater level of  control over the agent. Studies,
such as those by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder (2007), have suggested that
businesses  should  take  actions  to  try  to  mitigate  agency  problems  and  their  costs  by  implementing  a
remuneration scheme that is more apt for outside CEOs in such a way that the business’ interests are more in
line with those of  the CEO.
Other works, such as that of  Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), maintain that the nature of  the CEO could imply
different managerial abilities, in addition to creating different agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). And
thus,  the  choice  of  a  family  business  to take  on a  non-family  CEO depends  on the  characteristics  of  the
organization  and  the  managerial  abilities  required.  Along  this  line,  Lin  and  Hu  (2007)  suggest  that  when
businesses require high levels of  managerial skill, the performance of  the business will improve if  the CEO is
not a family member. This result could be explained in part by the greater ease of  finding qualified professionals
in  the  job  market  than  from within  the  family.  Similarly,  some articles  suggest  that  occasionally,  in  family
businesses, there is a certain willingness of  family members to take on managerial roles even though they do not
have the ability required to do so (Duréndez & García, 2005).
Thus,  greater  demands  for  executive  abilities  could  require  a  separation  between  the  ownership  and  the
management, and this could be done via the hiring of  an outside CEO (Burkart, Panunzi & Shleifer, 2003).
However, the level of  control that the family exercises over this CEO could have a negative effect on his/her
performance, as any attempt to improve the business could be impaired by the family (Burkart et al., 1997).
Aside from the managerial abilities required, there are other factors that could affect the choice to take on one
type of  CEO or the other. One of  the main factors is derived from the succession process in family businesses.
It is more and more common for there to be no successor or family member who is able, willing, or qualified
enough to accept the position (Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 2003). As a consequence of  this, it tends to be the
biggest oldest businesses that have more experience with non-family executives.
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3. Methodology
3.1. Sample selection
The sample that we used in this study was made up of  non-finance companies listed on the Spanish stock
market from 2012 to 2016 and present in the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System database (SABI, by its
Spanish  initials).  The  sample  originally  included  102  companies  but  was  later  reduced  when  we  removed
companies that did not have the data necessary for study during all of  the years considered. We also removed all
companies that showed negative equity capital in any year, as we considered these to be atypical situations that
could  distort  the  results  of  the  study.  Finally,  we  removed  companies  that,  during  the  period  considered,
underwent  ownership  changes  that  affected  their  classification  (family  or  non-family)  as  well  as  those  that
changed the classification of  CEO (family CEO or non-family CEO). After applying these filters, we were left
with a final sample of  78 businesses. 
We obtained economic and financial data, as well as information related to businesses’ ownership structures,
from the SABI database. Regarding information on the CEO, we found some errors in the aforementioned
source, so, we assessed the information with websites which provide this data with greater levels of  veracity. 
To classify businesses as “family” or “non-family” businesses—one of  the main issues in this kind of  study—a
definition of  “family business” had to be adopted. In Europe, there are more than 90 such definitions (Mandl,
2008). While they all address various different dimensions and might differ to some extent, they all focus upon
three key aspects: ownership controlled by one family, family participation in the management of  the business,
and the willingness to pass on ownership to the next generation.
For this  study,  we decided to use the definition suggested by the Instituto de la  Empresa Familiar  (Family
Business Institute,  2015). In their study, they considered the difference between businesses with a dispersed
ownership  structure  versus  those  with  a  well-concentrated  ownership  structure  to  be  the  main  factor  in
establishing an operational definition of  a family business. These differences in ownership structures have led to
a debate over what ownership percentage is appropriate for classifying a business as a family business. Along this
line, we felt that it was not appropriate to use the same percentages for all businesses, as in those with a more
disperse ownership structure; a high ownership percentage is not needed to exert control over the company. As
such, we used the criteria adopted by the Family Business Institute and the information available in the SABI
database to set up the following definitions:
• Disperse ownership structure (no shareholder has more than 50% of  capital). The family business will
be that in which one person owns 5% or one family owns 20% of  the capital, and the natural person
shareholder is a board member or the family represents shareholders with more than 20% of  capital and
governing power. Otherwise, the business will be classified as a non-family business.
• Concentrated  ownership  structure  (some  shareholder  has  more  than  50%  of  capital).  The  family
business will be that in which the family-member shareholder controls a high percentage (50.01%) of
ownership, or there are shareholder-board members with more than 50.01% involvement. Businesses
not fulfilling these conditions will be classified non-family businesses.
Once we applied these criteria, we conducted a revision in order to classify those businesses for which ownership
information was incomplete and/or unclear, and to revise the assignments that had been made.
The classification of  the businesses in our sample can be seen in Table 1. The majority were family businesses-
representing 61.54% of  all of  the businesses considered. This proportion is in line with the data that has been
published by the Family Business Institute. Family businesses represent around 90% of  all businesses in Spain,
but this proportion decreases significantly among larger companies, which is obviously the case for the listed
companies that were the object of  this study.
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Table 1. Distribution of  businesses in the sample
As for the type of  CEO in family businesses, the results showed similar proportions of  family and non-family
CEOs, with a slight majority being from outside of  the family. This result matches with the most recent data
published by the Family Business Institute (2018): while the large majority of  CEOs in family businesses are
indeed family members of  the owning family, the rate of  family CEOs decreases as the size of  the company
increases,  becoming almost  even  among large-sized businesses.  This  characteristic  is  not  unique to Spanish
companies. In the USA for example, 20% of  family businesses have an outside CEO (MassMutual American
Family Business report, 2003), and this number increases to 55% in the 141 large family businesses listed on the
S&P  500  (Anderson  &  Reeb,  2003).  Similarly,  in  Germany,  the  percentage  of  non-family  executives  on
management teams increases along with the size of  the family business (Klein, 2000).
Thus, our study focused on the 48 family businesses for which it was possible to define the type of  CEO (family
or non-family) and the influence that he/she had on the performance (especially ROA) of  the business. 
3.2. Definition of  the model
To analyze  the  influence of  having  a  family  or  outside  CEO on the  profitability  of  family  businesses,  we
estimated a multiple linear regression model. The variables we used are described hereafter and are summarized
in Table 2.
• Dependent Variable
As an indicator of  the profitability  of  the  company,  we used return on assets (ROA),  calculated as
income, before expenses and taxes, over total assets. This variable does not include capital costs, instead
reflecting the results achieved by the company via their use of  assets. Many studies have used ROA as a
variable that is representative of  the performance of  a company (Stickney, Brown & Wahlen, 2007), also
for family businesses (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andrés, 2014; Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda, 2010; Lam &
Lee, 2008).
• Independent Variable
As the independent variable, and the object of  our study, we included the “type of  CEO.” This took the
form of  a dichotomous variable that had a value of  0 if  the CEO was a family member and a value of  1
if  the  CEO was  not  a  family  member.  The  type  of  CEO could  entail  different  managerial  skills
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) or various kinds of  agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which
would undoubtedly affect company performance. The ability of  CEOs is vital to the performance of
businesses when they require high levels of  managerial skills (Burkart et al., 2003). And thus, in the listed
companies analyzed in this study, we expected that an outside (non-family) CEO would contribute to
attaining better outcomes.
• Control Variables
◦ Sector of  activity: All companies that have been accepted for listing on the Spanish stock market
and can be traded via  the Spanish Stock Market Interconnection System (SIBE, by its  Spanish
initials) or by the Corros system, are classified into one unified sectoral and sub-sectoral framework
that was introduced on 1 January 2005. This framework defines six basic sectors: petroleum and
energy; basic materials, industry, and construction; consumer goods; consumer services; financial
-132-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1353
services and real estate; and technology and telecommunications. Given that we excluded companies
from the finance sector from the study and that there were no family real estate businesses in the
sample, the model allowed for the existence of  the five remaining sectors. As a consequence, five
dummy variables were included in the model, with the basic materials, industry, and construction
sector (the largest sector) serving as a reference. Then, the “petroleum and energy” variable took the
value of  1 if  the business belonged to this sector and 0, otherwise. The “consumer goods” variable
took the value of  1 if  the business belonged to this sector and 0, otherwise, and so on successively
with the rest of  the sectoral variables. As a result, the regression coefficients for these variables
represent the differential effect of  each sector on the dependent variable (ROA) in relation to the
reference category (basic materials, industry, and construction). Previous studies have confirmed the
existence of  differences depending on the sector in which the business operates (Stickney et al.,
2007).
◦ Year: Five dummy variables corresponding to the respective years under study (2012, 2013, 2014,
2015, and 2016) were included, with 2012 being used as the reference year. In this way, the “2012”
variable took the value of  1 if  the observation corresponded to this year and 0, otherwise. The
“2013” variable took the value of  1 if  the observation corresponded to this year and 0, otherwise,
and so on successively for the rest of  the years considered. As a result, the regression coefficients
for these variables represent the differential effect of  each year on the dependent variable, with
regard to the reference category (2012). As pointed out by Salas-Fumás (2014), the levels of  ROA
of  non-finance companies  in Spain decreased during the first  years  of  the  economic recession
(2007-2008) and progressively recovered and reached their  highest  levels  in  the following years.
Nevertheless, given that the period of  time being considered in our study could still include effects
from this economic recession, we felt it was necessary to control for time in our analysis. 
◦ Total assets (Ln(Assets)): Calculated as the natural logarithm of  a company’s total assets so as to
minimize asymmetry of  the variable given its high level of  variability, its size is related to many of  a
business’ characteristics, and for this reason, it is often included as a control variable (Anderson &
Reeb, 2003; Andrés, 2014; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Arosa et al.,
2010). Previous studies have found a negative relationship between the size of  the company and
performance (Lang & Stulz, 1994).
◦ Age of  the  company  (Ln(Age)):  Measured  as  the  number  of  years  since  the  founding  of  the
company, we took the natural logarithm of  age in order to minimize asymmetry, given the high level
of  variability found in this variable. The inclusion of  age as a control variable is common in the
literature (Andres, 2014; Arosa et al., 2010; Cabrera-Suárez & Martín-Santana, 2015). It is seen as a
measure of  a company’s ability to compete in a highly competitive environment. Previously, Evans
(2007) observed a positive relationship between age and profitability, though Cooley and Quadrini
(2001) affirmed that the growth of  a company decreases as age increases. Similarly, Shleifer and
Vishny (1989) suggested that in family businesses, getting bogged down with family issues could
lead to founders remaining active in the company, even though they are not competent enough to
do so. This is common in business with concentrated ownership structures.
◦ Indebtedness (Debt): Measured as the total debt of  the company over its total assets. Andrés (2014)
and Arosa  et  al.  (2010)  identified  a  significant  negative  influence  of  the  level  of  debt  on  the
profitability of  non-listed Spanish businesses. Thus, we expected to find a similar relationship in
listed companies.
◦ Liquidity ratio (Liquid): Calculated as the current assets over current liabilities. This measure allows
us to analyze the ability of  a business to confront their debts in the short term. Its inclusion as a
control variable is common (Gul & Leung, 2004; Lam & Lee, 2008).
◦ Growth of  sales (GSales): Calculated as “year x sales / year x-1 sales.” Previous studies, including
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) and Arosa et al. (2010), have included this variable in their models as
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businesses that grew more in the past have greater possibilities of  growing in the future, and thus,
influencing ROA.
Table 2. Variables included in the model
Thus, the representation of  our model is as follows:
0 1 2 6 7 11 12
13 14 15 16
ROA CEO SECTOR YEAR LnASSETS
LnAGE DEBT LIQUID GSALES
b b b b b
b b b b





Before estimating the model that allowed us to identify the influence of  the type of  CEO on a family business’
ROA, we analyzed a set of  economic and financial variables in order to see whether or not there were managerial
differences between the CEOs. Specifically,  we took a look at  the  variables related to profitability,  financial
structure, growth, and dividends policy.
4.1.1. Return on assets
Regarding ROA, we observed that businesses with an outside CEO tended to perform better than businesses
with a family CEO, though this trend was not found in all  of  the years considered (Table 3 and Figure 1).
Throughout the period (2012-2016), businesses with a non-family CEO showed an average ROA of  4.08%,
while businesses with a family CEO had an average of  3.22%.
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 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 3.80% 3.13% 3.96% 5.37% 4.16%
Family CEO 0.84% 2.93% 5.33% 2.65% 4.38%
Table 3. ROA by type of  CEO
Figure 1. ROA by type of  CEO
The  greater  average  profitability  seen  in  family  businesses  run  by  non-family  CEOs  suggests  that  these
executives have better managerial skills and a greater tendency to prioritize financial results over other kinds of
objectives. Nevertheless, given the influence that various, potentially internal, factors could have on levels of
profitability, a univariate analysis is not the most appropriate for corroborating these conclusions. It is for this
reason that we decided to perform an econometric analysis that allowed us to isolate the affect that the type of
CEO has on the profitability of  these businesses.
4.1.2. Financial structure
Table 4 shows the evolution of  the average indebtedness of  businesses by type of  CEO (family or non-family).
These  results  suggest  that  family  CEOs prefer  self-financing,  a  preference  that  is  justified  by  their  greater
apparent risk aversion and prioritizing maintaining control over the company. This behavior by family CEOs is in
line with behavior that is traditionally associated with family businesses, i.e., they prefer to finance with their own
family money (Gallizo, Mar-Molinero, Moreno & Salvador, 2017b; Hamilton & Fox, 1998; Romano, Tanewski, &
Smyrnios, 2000) or with undistributed profits (Hamilton & Fox, 1998; Barton & Matthews, 1989) instead of
using debt or bringing on new shareholders. On the contrary, the results obtained for non-family CEOs show
evidence of  their preference for taking on debt, a practice that is more in line with non-family businesses.
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 2.54 3.22 3.01 2.80 2.06
Family CEO 2.48 2.58 1.87 1.53 1.29
Table 4. Level of  debt (Liabilities/Equity) by type of  CEO
For a more in-depth analysis we calculated the bank debt ratio. This ratio takes into account the type of  debt
which generates financial expenses for the company, and consequently, the type of  debt which directly affects the
results of  the company. The results are shown in Table 5.
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 1.98 2.52 2.30 2.09 1.54
Family CEO 1.53 1.55 1.14 0.86 0.71
Table 5. Bank debt ratio (Financial debt /Equity) by type of  CEO
-135-
Intangible Capital – https://doi.org/10.3926/ic.1353
The results in Table 5 corroborate what we previously saw regarding levels of  debt: non-family CEOs opt for
greater levels of  bank debt ratio in all of  the years considered in this study.
In order to analyze the financial structure, we also calculated the liquidity ratio, which shows the ability of  a
company to pay off  debt obligations in the short term. Table 6 shows the results of  this analysis.
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 1.07 1.36 1.35 1.28 1.12
Family CEO 1.60 2.12 1.06 1.40 1.47
Table 6. Liquidity ratio (Current assets/Current liabilities) by type of  CEO
We can see that in all of  the years analyzed, except for 2014, businesses with a family CEO had greater levels of
liquidity compared to businesses with a non-family CEO. As before, these results show that family CEOs tend to
have a greater risk aversion than non-family executives and they prefer financial autonomy even though this may
occasionally mean lower levels of  profitability as a result of  not taking full advantage of  available resources.
4.1.3. Growth
In this section, we take a look at the differences in growth that businesses saw depending on the type of  CEO
that they had. Specifically, we show the growth in total assets (Table 7) and the growth in noncurrent assets
(Table 8).
As we can see, businesses with a non-family CEO saw greater levels of  asset growth throughout the period
considered, and this growth was positive in all years. Contrarily, businesses with a family CEO saw these levels
decrease, on average, over the years analyzed.
Characteristics that we saw in businesses with a family CEO mirror those that have been observed in previous
studies  on  family  businesses,  where  it  is  suggested  that  such  businesses  prefer  control,  which  limits  their
possibilities for growth (Galve & Salas, 2011).
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 1.42% 5.89% 4.91% 5.74% 2.79%
Family CEO -2.59% -2.81% 4.27% -2.22% 0.52%
Table 7. Asset growth by type of  CEO
To make a more in-depth analysis, we also considered the growth of  noncurrent assets (Table 8). The results of
this analysis once again show that businesses with non-family CEOs saw greater levels of  growth over the period
analyzed. 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 8.82% 4.90% 5.73% 8.65% 7.25%
Family CEO 2.59% 2.73% 6.67% 2.28% 3.80%
Table 8. Noncurrent asset growth by type of  CEO
These results are not surprising given that investments in noncurrent assets are generally financed with long-term
funding. Previously, we showed that businesses with family CEOs have lower average levels  of  debt. These
businesses also tend to limit the entrance of  new associates in order to maintain control of  the company. Both
of  these facts restrict their investment abilities (Galve & Salas, 2011).
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4.1.4. Dividend payout
Finally, we calculated the average payout of  businesses with family CEOs and those with non-family CEOs
(Table  9).  The  results  we  obtained  show  that,  over  the  period  considered  (with  the  exception  of  2015),
businesses with a non-family CEO distributed a larger portion of  their profits as dividends.
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Non-family CEO 39.04% 49.67% 45.17% 44.59% 48.34%
Family CEO 38.25% 44.28% 44.84% 49.13% 44.37%
Table 9. Payout (Dividends/Profit) for businesses with profit by type of  CEO
Previous studies have suggested that there is a hierarchy that exists in family businesses when it comes to their
financing preferences: they are more averse to risk and implement more restrictive dividend policies (Gallizo et
al., 2017a; Romano et al., 2000). Along this line, family CEOs tend to favor reinvesting profits in order to finance
the growth of  the business and ensure its survival. On the contrary, non-family CEOs tend to favor distributing
dividends, which attests to their managerial abilities. 
4.2. Regression results
First, we estimated a model without control variables related to the financial structure of  the businesses. We did
this because, as per the previous section, we saw that the financial structure of  a business is largely determined
by the type of  CEO that is running it. In line with previous studies that have shown the influence that these
variables have on ROA (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2014; Arosa et al., 2010; etc.), inclusion of  this variable
could mask part  of  the influence that  the  type of  CEO has  on profitability.  Results  corresponding to the
estimation of  this model are shown in Table 10. 
With regard to the variable being studied—the type of  CEO—we can see that its influence, though positive, is
not statistically significant, which would lead us to draw the conclusion that the type of  CEO (family or non-
family) does not influence the levels of  profitability of  the businesses analyzed. 
With regard to the control variables, the most noteworthy results are the strong influence that the sectors of
activity have on ROA. With the basic materials, industry, and construction as a reference, we can see that the
consumer  goods sector  has  a  positive and statistically  significant influence on ROA (at  the 1%-level).  This
indicates that businesses in this sector tend to see greater levels of  profitability than businesses in the reference
sector. On the other hand, companies in the petroleum and energy sector and those in the technology and
telecommunications sector show a statistically significant (again, at the 1%-level) negative influence, suggesting
that  businesses  that  operate  in  these  sectors  have  lower  levels  of  profitability  than  those  operating  in  the
reference sector.
As for the year in which the observations were made, none of  the dummy variables included in the model had a
significant influence on ROA, suggesting that there were no significant differences between the years in the
period analyzed, with regard to profitability. This result is in line with the work done by Salas-Fumás (2014),
where ROA in Spanish businesses was seen to have decreased at the beginning of  the economic recession (2007-
2008) but recovered over the following years with no major differences since then.
Among the rest of  the variables considered, only one was statistically significant (at the 5%-level): the age of  the
company.  Specifically,  we can see that this variable has a negative sign,  suggesting that businesses that have
existed for longer will  see lower levels of  ROA than younger businesses.  This result has been documented
previously by Andrés (2014). 
None of  the other variables (natural logarithm of  total assets and sales growth) had a significant influence on
ROA.
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Table 10. Coefficients of  the model without financial variables
Hereafter,  we present the results for the estimation of  the model with the variables related to the financial
structure  of  the  company included,  specifically  the  debt  ratio  (liabilities/total  assets)  and the  liquidity  ratio
(current assets/current liabilities). This allowed us to see whether there were changes in the influence that the
type of  CEO had on ROA when we isolate the effect that the variables related to the financial structure may
have had. The results of  this regression appear in Table 11.
As we can see below, the inclusion of  these two new variables has slightly improved the goodness of  fit of  the
model. Furthermore, we can see that the indebtedness has a significant negative influence (at the 1% level). So,
this result confirms that there is a negative relationship between a company’s debt and its profitability, a result
that is in line with the findings of  previous studies (Andres, 2014; Arossa et al., 2010).
Table 11. Coefficients of  the entire model
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Once we isolate the effect of  the level of  debt, we can see the influence that the “type of  CEO” variable has is
statistically significant (at the 10%-level). Thus, having a non-family CEO contributes to improving the ROA of
a business. This result suggests that non-family CEOs have certain abilities that contribute to the improvement
of  profitability that were not seen in the previous model because of  the negative influence that the level of  debt
(which was previously captured by the “type of  CEO” variable) had in the regression.
The results that we obtained in these two models reveal a double effect of  having a non-family CEO on ROA.
First, there is a negative effect that comes from their preference to take on debt, which has been shown to
worsen  the  profitability  of  companies.  And  then,  a  positive  effect,  derived  from  the  non-family  CEO’s
managerial abilities and focus on profits. 
5. Discussion and conclusions
The present study analyzed the influence that the type of  CEO (family or non-family) has on a set of  variables
related to the management of  family businesses, and especially their influence on ROA.
To do this, we analyzed a sample of  48 family businesses that were listed on the Spanish stock market from 2012
to 2016. First, we carried out a univariate analysis of  the set of  economic and financial variables in order to see
whether there were actually any differences in the way that family CEOs manage compared to non-family CEOs.
The results of  this analysis revealed that there were specific differences in the management styles of  these CEOs
of  family businesses, especially regarding policies on debt, growth, and dividend payouts. We found that the level
of  total  debt  was  greater  in  family  businesses with a  non-family CEO, which suggests  that  these kinds  of
executives have a greater willingness to take on debt than family CEOs. This kind of  performance is more in line
with the behavior of  non-family businesses. Similarly, businesses with a family CEO maintain greater levels of
short-term liquidity, suggesting their greater aversion to risk and preference to have greater financial autonomy.
With regard to growth, the results show that family businesses with a non-family CEO obtain greater investment
rates than family businesses with a family CEO. On average, businesses with a family CEO decreased in size due
to growth restrictions stemming from their characteristics as a family business with a family CEO. Also, with
respect to dividend payouts, our results show that businesses with a non-family CEO tend to distribute a greater
proportion of  their profits as dividends; this is in line with the hypothesis that family CEOs generally opt more
for reinvesting profits in the company itself.
Finally, to analyze the influence of  the type of  CEO on ROA, we estimated a multiple linear regression model in
which we first estimated the influence of  the type of  CEO without including control variables related to the
financial structure of  the business (variables that are closely related to the type of  CEO) and then with these
variables (specifically, the debt ratio and the liquidity ratio) included in order to see whether isolating their effect
could change the observed influence of  the type of  CEO on ROA.
The results of  the initial estimation showed the absence of  a significant effect of  the type of  CEO on ROA,
however, based on the results of  the second estimation, we were able to deduce that the greater levels of  debt
that family businesses with a non-family CEO take on negatively influence their levels of  profitability. Then,
when this negative effect was isolated, we were able to see the statistically significant positive effect that a non-
family CEO had on the businesses, which could be explained by their managerial skills and greater focus on
profits. Ultimately, the results of  our study speak to the existence of  a double effect that non-family CEOs have
on the profitability of  family businesses.
The main shortcoming of  this study lies in the reduced number of  businesses available for consideration, as we
focused exclusively on listed family businesses in Spain. Future research should therefore expand the scope of
similar  analyses  to include a  larger  sample  of  businesses,  possibly  including non-listed  companies.  Another
interesting question that should be considered is whether the president of  the business takes on an executive role
or not, as if  he/she did, it could restrict the independent management of  a non-family CEO.
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